WEINGARTEN COMMENTARY 1.8.12 V.5 (DO NOT DELETE)

1/8/2012 6:46 PM

MINNECI V. POLLARD
AND THE UPHILL CLIMB TO
BIVENS RELIEF
ELLIOT J. WEINGARTEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
If an inmate at a privately operated prison facility is the victim of
Eighth Amendment violations, does he have an implied right to sue
1
the prison employees? In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, the
Supreme Court created an implied right of action against federal
2
employees for federal constitutional violations. Minneci v. Pollard
asks the Supreme Court to expand this implied right of relief against
3
employees of a privately operated prison facility. Over the past thirty
years, the Court has consistently denied Bivens expansion to new
categories of plaintiffs. Indeed, Harvard Law Professor Laurence
Tribe wrote that Bivens is “on life support with little prospect of
4
recovery.” Convincing the Supreme Court to grant a Bivens remedy
is no easy task; under current law, there are many obstacles a plaintiff
must overcome in order to obtain an implied right to relief.
II. FACTS
Respondent Richard Pollard is a federal prisoner serving a
5
twenty-year sentence for drug trafficking and firearms offenses.
Pollard alleges that he slipped and fell at the Taft Correctional
Institution (TCI), was diagnosed with possible fractures of both
6
elbows, and was referred to an outside orthopedic clinic. Before

* J.D. Candidate 2013, Duke University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Stephen
Sachs for his help and guidance in writing this commentary.
1. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
2. Minneci v. Pollard, No. 10-1104 (U.S. argued Nov. 1, 2011).
3. Brief for Petitioners at i, Minneci, No. 10-1104 (U.S. July 22, 2011).
4. Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without
Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 26 (2007).
5. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 3.
6. Id. at 4. The Taft Correctional Institution (TCI) is a privately owned correctional
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being transported, Pollard was forced to wear a restrictive “jumpsuit”
7
and a “black box” mechanical restraint device, despite complaining of
8
severe pain while wearing them. The orthopedic clinic recommended
9
that Pollard wear a posterior splint around his elbow for two weeks.
Pollard, however, was unable to wear the splint because of inadequate
10
facilities. In the following weeks, Pollard could not feed or bathe
himself because of his injury and the prison staff failed to make
11
alternative arrangements. Pollard was required to return to work
before his injuries healed and again was forced to wear a “black box”
restraint when returning to the orthopedic clinic for a subsequent
12
appointment.
In 2001, Pollard filed a civil complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of California and named eight TCI
13
employees as defendants. He alleged Eighth Amendment violations
and sought damages against the individual TCI employees for
providing inadequate medical care while he was housed at the
14
prison. The district court adopted the recommendation of the
magistrate judge and dismissed the case because the allegations
lacked an implied remedy under Bivens and because alternative
15
remedies were available to Pollard.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
After Bivens was decided, the Court expanded the doctrine over
the following decade to include both Fifth and Eighth Amendment
violations in limited circumstances. Since then, however, the Court has
not allowed any new category of plaintiff access to a Bivens remedy.

facility in California that contracts with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to house federal
inmates. Id. Pollard was housed at TCI when the accident occurred. Id.
7. Id. at 4–5 (“[T]he term generally refers to a plastic box that covers the lock of a
prisoner’s handcuffs. A chain runs through the box and around the prisoner’s waist and secures
his hands to his stomach.”).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 5.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 6.
13. Id. at 8.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7–8.
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A. Bivens and Its Expansion
The remedy Pollard seeks was created forty years ago by the
Supreme Court as a remedy for constitutional violations by federal
officers. The original case, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
created an implied damages remedy for victims of Fourth
16
Amendment violations by federal agents. In that case, after federal
agents searched and arrested Webster Bivens without a warrant or
probable cause, the agents handcuffed him and threatened to arrest
17
his family as well. The officers then took Bivens to a federal court
where he was “interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip
18
search.” The unreasonable search and seizure—and the perverse
conduct of the officers—violated Bivens’s Fourth Amendment rights
and subjected him to “great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental
19
suffering.” The Court deemed a state law remedy inadequate for a
20
federal constitutional violation and created an implied right of relief,
allowing Bivens to recover money damages from the offending
21
officers.
22
Eight years later in Davis v. Passman, the Court expanded the
23
Bivens doctrine to include Fifth Amendment due process violations.
Shirley Davis, a female secretary to Congressman Otto Passman, was
terminated from her position because Passman believed “that it was
24
essential that [his secretary] be a man.” Davis brought a suit alleging
that Passman’s conduct sexually discriminated against her and
25
violated her Fifth Amendment rights. Passman claimed that “no
26
private right of action” existed for the claim. The Court disagreed
and again recognized an implied right of action for the deprivation of
a constitutional right because “the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
16. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
(1971).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 389–90.
20. See id. at 392 (observing that the Fourth Amendment acts as a limit to federal power,
and thus causes of action under the Fourth Amendment cannot be limited by state law or to tort
actions under state law).
21. Id. at 397.
22. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
23. Id. at 234–35.
24. Id. at 230 (quoting Letter from Otto E. Passman, Congressman, to Shirley Davis,
Petitioner) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id. at 231.
26. Id. at 232 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 4, Davis, 442 U.S. 228 (No. 78-572))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Amendment forbids the Federal Government to deny equal
27
protection of the laws.”
28
Finally, in Carlson v. Green, the Court expanded the doctrine yet
again and recognized that victims of Eighth Amendment violations
29
can also obtain Bivens relief. The administratrix of an estate sued on
behalf of her son because the deliberate indifference of prison
30
medical staff caused his death. Relief under state law was
unavailable but the parties disputed the availability of relief under
31
32
federal law. Although the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) created
a remedy for torts of this kind, the Court found that the FTCA does
not preempt a Bivens remedy because employees are not individually
33
liable under that statute. Rather, the intention of Congress was to
allow for FTCA claims against the United States and Bivens claims
34
against the individual employees. Making the FTCA and Bivens
complementary causes of action creates “a more effective deterrent”
35
against individual officers than an exclusive FTCA remedy.
B. Bivens Contraction
Since Carlson, however, the Court has refused to extend Bivens
remedies to new categories of plaintiffs even when no adequate
alternative remedies exist. Just three years after Carlson in Bush v.
36
Lucas, the Court denied Bivens relief for a First Amendment
37
violation by a federal employer. In Bush, a NASA engineer’s pay
was downgraded significantly after he stated publicly that his job was
38
a “travesty and worthless.” The engineer sued his employer, alleging
a First Amendment violation and seeking damages under the

27. Id. at 235 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
28. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
29. Id. at 19–20.
30. Id. at 16 n.1.
31. Id. at 24.
32. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West 2011).
33. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19. Since the implementation of the Federal Employees Liability
Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act), Pub. L. No. 100–694, § 5, 102 Stat.
4563 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A § 2679(b)(1) (West 2011)), Bivens provides the only
remedy against federal employees covered by the FTCA. The United States is the sole
defendant in FTCA actions.
34. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19–20.
35. Id. at 21.
36. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
37. Id. at 390.
38. Id. at 369 (citation omitted).
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39

rationale of Bivens. The Court determined that the administrative
system created by Congress “provides meaningful remedies for
employees who may have been unfairly disciplined for making critical
40
comments about their agencies,” and denied Bivens relief.
The Court has also made Bivens relief unavailable to military
41
personnel harmed through activity incident to service. In Chappell v.
42
Wallace, the Court denied military personnel Bivens remedies when
plaintiffs alleged equal protection violations by their superiors that
resulted in the “fail[ure] to assign [the plaintiffs] desirable duties,
threat[s], . . . low performance evaluations, and penalties of unusual
43
44
severity.” The Court found “factors counseling hesitation” in “[t]he
need for special regulations in relation to military discipline and
consequent need and justification for a special and exclusive system
45
of military justice.” Moreover, the Constitution explicitly gives
Congress the power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and
46
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”
47
Additionally, the Court found in Schweiker v. Chilicky that
wrongful denials of Social Security benefits resulting in due process
48
violations do not give rise to Bivens liability. The remedy sought was
“consequential damages for hardships resulting from an allegedly
49
unconstitutional denial of [Social Security benefits].” A Bivens
remedy, however, was refused because “Congress is the body charged
with making the inevitable compromises required in the design of a
massive and complex welfare benefits program” and the
50
administrative process provided adequate relief.

39. Id. at 370–72.
40. Id. at 385–86.
41. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,
305 (1983).
42. Chappell, 462 U.S. 296.
43. Id. at 297.
44. Id. at 298 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 396 (1976)).
45. Id. at 300; see also Stanley, 483 U.S. at 684 (“[N]o Bivens remedy is available for
injuries that ‘arise out of . . . activity incident to [military] service.’” (quoting Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950))).
46. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
47. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
48. Id. at 414.
49. Id. at 428.
50. Id. at 429.
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51

In FDIC v. Meyer, the Court held that Bivens relief is not
52
available against federal agencies. In Meyer, the FDIC took over an
53
insolvent thrift institution and terminated a senior officer. The senior
officer then sued the FDIC alleging that the summary discharge
deprived him of a property right in violation of the Fifth
54
Amendment. According to the Court, the “logic of Bivens” did not
support the remedy sought by the employee because the FDIC had
authority to “take such action as may be necessary to put [the thrift]
55
in a sound solvent condition.”
56
Similarly, in Corrective Services Corp. v. Malesko, the Court
refused Bivens relief against a private corporation operating a
halfway house under contract with the Federal Bureau of Prisons
57
(BOP) because a Bivens claim must be alleged against an individual.
Moreover, “no federal prisoners enjoy[ed] [Malesko’s] contemplated
58
remedy.” The Court stated that federal prisoners in government-run
facilities alleging constitutional violations could bring Bivens claims
59
against the offending officers. A prisoner cannot, however, bring a
Bivens claim against “the officer’s employer, the United States, or the
60
BOP.” Furthermore, the presence of adequate alternative remedies
61
weighed against providing an additional Bivens remedy.
62
In Wilkie v. Robbins, the most important case in recent Bivens
jurisprudence, a landowner sought Bivens damages against Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) employees who extorted him into granting
63
an easement. In denying the landowner Bivens relief, the Court, with
Justice Souter writing for the majority, created a test to determine if
Bivens relief is available. First, the Court must ask whether an
64
alternative, existing process exists. Although this can be a convincing
reason to refrain from creating a new remedy, this question is not
51. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
52. Id. at 473.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 473–74. The plaintiff claimed a Fifth Amendment right to continued employment
under California law. Id.
55. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(1)(A)(ii) (repealed 1989)).
56. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
57. Id. at 71–72.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 74.
62. 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
63. Id. at 547–48.
64. Id. at 550.
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always dispositive on its own. The Court must look to the second
65
question: whether there are “special factors counseling hesitation.”
Even if there are no existing alternative processes, those special
66
factors may prevent the Court from authorizing a remedy. In Wilkie,
the landowner had alternative and adequate administrative and
judicial processes for “vindicating virtually all of his complaints”; thus,
67
the Court denied Bivens relief.
C. Decisions of Other Circuits
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the specific issue in this
case—whether private employees are liable under Bivens—but three
68
circuit courts addressed this issue and denied Bivens relief. In Holly
69
v. Scott, for example, a diabetic federal prisoner housed in a private
prison facility attempted to sue the employees of the facility for
70
inadequate medical care. The Fourth Circuit denied the plaintiff
Bivens relief because of two factors, “each of which independently
71
preclude[d] the extension of Bivens.” First, as employees of a private
corporation, the defendants did not act under the color of federal
72
law. Second, the availability of an alternative and superior cause of
73
action under state negligence law counseled hesitation. Thus,
because state law would have provided the plaintiff with an adequate
alternative remedy, “[t]his [was] not a circumstance under which the
74
extension of a judicially implied remedy [was] appropriate.”

65. Id. (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 553–54.
68. Holly v. Scott 434 F.3d 287, 288 (4th Cir. 2006); Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d
1090, 1100 (10th Cir. 2005) (dismissing a Bivens suit against private employees because of
available state remedies and because “[t]he caution toward extending Bivens remedies into any
new context . . . foreclose[d] such an extension here”); Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1254
(11th Cir. 2008) (disposing of a Bivens claim against private prison employees because the
employees were not federal actors and a state tort remedy was available).
69. Holly, 434 F.3d at 287.
70. Id. at 288.
71. Id. at 290.
72. See id. at 292 (“Defendants are not federal officials, federal employees, or even
independent contractors in the service of the federal government.”).
73. Id. at 295.
74. Id. at 297.
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IV. HOLDING
Despite these holdings, a split Ninth Circuit panel allowed Pollard
75
to pursue Bivens relief. Because Bivens provides a cause of action
76
only against an official “acting under the color of federal law,” the
court first determined whether private prison employees act under
77
color of federal law using the “public function” test. Under this test,
a private entity engages in state action when exercising “powers
78
traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.” The court found that
imprisonment is fundamentally a public function, regardless of
whether the facility is managed by the government or a private
79
entity.
The court then used the two-part Wilkie test to determine if
80
Bivens relief was available. First, the court found that an “alternative,
existing process” was in place, but that an existing process does not
necessarily prevent the judicial branch from creating a new judicial
81
remedy. The court stated that “the mere availability of a state law
82
remedy” does not prevent the allowance of a Bivens cause of action.
According to the court, the policy underlying Bivens is that “the
liability of federal officials for violations of citizens’ constitutional
83
rights should be governed by uniform rules.” If state tort law
precluded Bivens, the liability of federal officials would not be
84
uniform because state tort law varies widely by state. Thus, state tort
remedies alone cannot “displace a Bivens remedy under the first
85
prong of the Wilkie test.”

75. Pollard v. GEO Group, 629 F.3d 843, 850 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom.
Minneci v. Pollard, 131 S. Ct. 2449 (U.S. argued Nov. 1, 2011) (No. 10-1104).
76. Id. at 854 (quoting Morgan v. United States, 323 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. at 855. This test is traditionally used to determine if private individuals act under
the color of state law for the purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2011). Id.
78. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
79. Id. at 857 (“The relevant function here is not prison management, but rather
incarceration of prisoners, which has of course traditionally been the State’s ‘exclusive
prerogative.’”(quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982))).
80. Id. at 859 (citing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)).
81. Id. at 859–60.
82. Id. at 860.
83. Id. at 862 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
84. Id. at 862–63.
85. Id. at 863.
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Second, the court found no “special factors counseling hesitation”
86
that prevented the panel from allowing Bivens relief. The court
considered the following as past special factors, which had previously
disallowed Bivens remedies: (1) “whether it is feasible to create a
87
workable cause of action”; (2) whether extending a remedy would
88
undermine Bivens’s deterrence goals; (3) whether extending Bivens
imposes asymmetric liability costs on privately operated facilities
89
compared to government-run facilities; and (4) whether a unique
attribute of the area gives reason to believe that congressional action
90
is deliberate. After consideration of each factor, the panel concluded
that none caused enough hesitation to warrant the denial of a Bivens
91
remedy and that Pollard could proceed in his quest for Bivens relief.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner Minneci’s Arguments
Minneci argues that Pollard’s alternative remedies are adequate
substitutes for a Bivens remedy and, alternatively, if the Court finds
that those remedies are not adequate, that Minneci’s status as a
private employee is a factor counseling hesitation.
1. Pollard’s alternative remedies are adequate and superior
substitutes for a Bivens remedy.
Minneci argues that Pollard’s alternative remedies are adequate
for four reasons. First, Minneci contrasts this case with the three cases
92
in which a Bivens remedy was made available. In each previous
case––Bivens, Davis, and Carlson––no adequate alternative remedies
93
were available for the plaintiffs. Here, Pollard has an adequate
94
alternative remedy in state tort law. Thus, Pollard should be denied
Bivens relief because the Court “respond[s] cautiously to suggestions
95
that Bivens remedies be extended into new contexts.”

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. (citing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 555 (2007)).
Id. at 863 (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70–71 (2001)).
Id. (citing Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72).
Id. (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)).
Id. at 869.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13 (quoting Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988)).
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Second, Minneci contends that Pollard is most similar to the
plaintiff in Malesko because Pollard’s alternative remedies are “at
least as great, and in many respects greater, than anything that could
96
be had under Bivens.” Malesko, like Pollard, was “‘not a plaintiff in
97
search of a remedy’ like Bivens or Davis.” Instead, Malesko only
sought an extension of Bivens, and the Court is cautious toward such
98
expansion. Because Pollard is similarly situated to Malesko and
seeks Bivens expansion, Minneci believes Pollard should also be
99
denied relief.
Third, Minneci disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s determination
that an alternative to Bivens relief must be federally created.
According to Minneci, a state tort remedy is an adequate substitute
for Bivens and alternative remedies need not be governed by uniform
100
federal rules. The Ninth Circuit’s concern with state law remedies—
that plaintiffs in different jurisdictions might face different procedural
requirements or be subject to limits on damages—should not concern
the Court because these requirements “merely place all plaintiffs on
101
the same footing when they bring suit for the same sorts of injuries.”
Thus, Minneci claims that alternative state remedies suffice as long as
102
all plaintiffs in a particular jurisdiction enjoy equal remedies.
Finally, Minneci argues that the state law remedies available to
103
Pollard are superior to a Bivens remedy because of California law. A
104
general duty of care applies to all citizens and a heightened duty of
care applies specifically to jailers because of a “special relationship
105
between jailer and prisoner.” If Pollard could prove “injury resulting
either from negligence or . . . [the] duty to protect him from
106
foreseeable harm,” he would be entitled to damages. Additionally, a

96. Id. at 20 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74).
98. Id. (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 73 (finding that a state tort remedy against a private prison management
company was an adequate alterative to Bivens).
101. Id. at 23.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 25.
104. Id. at 26 (proposing that “as a general rule, persons have a duty to use due care to
avoid injury to others, and may be held liable if their careless conduct injures another person”
(quoting Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
105. Id. (quoting Giraldo v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371, 383 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008)).
106. Id. at 27.
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constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment requires
Pollard to prove that defendants were “deliberat[ly] indifferen[t] to
serious medication needs,” causing “unnecessary and wanton
107
infliction of pain.” Because “deliberate indifference describes a state
108
of mind more blameworthy than negligence,” Pollard’s odds of
109
succeeding in Bivens are less likely than in a negligence suit.
2. Even if the alternative remedies are not sufficient to deny
Bivens relief, Petitioners’ status as private employees gives rise to a
factor counseling hesitation that independently warrants reversal.
Minneci also argues that as private employees they “lack the
recognized immunities of their governmental counterparts, resulting
in asymmetrical liability risks and eliminating a principal rationale for
110
recognition of the Bivens doctrine.” Federal employees can claim
qualified immunity when sued under Bivens, which decreases a
plaintiff’s chances of success because qualified immunity “permits
courts expeditiously to weed out suits . . . without requiring time111
consuming preparation to defend the suit on its merits.” Minneci
believes that lack of qualified immunity should concern the Court
because Bivens claims against private prison contractors would be
more successful than those against employees at government-run
112
prisons. According to Minneci, authorizing asymmetric liability in
Bivens suits is not a decision for the Court because of the hesitation
“to create an anomaly whereby private defendants face greater
113
constitutional liability than public officials.” Minneci argues that
Congress, not a court, should decide whether Pollard is entitled to
114
Bivens relief.

107. Id. at 28 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
108. Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)).
109. Id. at 28–29.
110. Id. at 36.
111. Id. at 38–39 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
112. Id. at 37–38 (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001)).
113. Id. at 39 (quoting Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 294 (4th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
114. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72 (stating that authorizing Bivens liability “is a question for
Congress, not [the Court], to decide”).
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B. Respondent Pollard’s Arguments
Pollard presents two main arguments to demonstrate that a Bivens
remedy is available here. First, Pollard argues that the Bivens doctrine
encompasses all Eighth Amendment violations. Second, Pollard
believes that the existence of state law remedies alone does not
preclude a Bivens remedy.
1. Pollard advances three arguments supporting the claim that the
Bivens doctrine encompasses all Eighth Amendment violations.
Pollard argues that since Carlson, the Court has never
distinguished between public and private employees acting under the
115
color of federal law for the purpose of a Bivens remedy. Pollard
analogizes the issue at hand to that in Carlson because, like that
victim, Pollard is a federal prisoner who was tried, convicted, and
116
sentenced for a violation of federal law. Additionally, Pollard claims
117
Eighth Amendment violations by federal agents. Thus, Pollard
argues that the application of Carlson permits him to receive a Bivens
118
remedy.
If Carlson does not provide a Bivens remedy, Pollard argues that
“privately held federal prisoners would be the only prisoners in the
country unable to enforce their Eighth Amendment rights through a
119
damages action.” In privately operated prisons, federal prisoners are
often held in the same facilities, and even in neighboring cells, as state
prisoners. If two prisoners held in the same prison suffer the same
constitutional violation, two different remedies are available to them:
state prisoners may pursue a § 1983 claim, while federal prisoners may
120
only pursue a tort claim. Pollard believes the remedies should be
uniform because private and public employees are not distinguished
121
in Bivens cases.
Indeed, Pollard contends that there is no
significance to a company’s private status because in Malesko the
private prison company was “in every meaningful sense, the same” as

115. Brief for Respondent at 4–5, Minneci v. Pollard, No. 10-1104 (U.S. Sep. 12, 2011), 2011
WL 4100439, at *4–5.
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 8.
119. Id. (arguing that prisoners in publicly operated federal facilities can bring damages
actions under Bivens, while prisoners in both publicly and privately operated state facilities can
bring § 1983 actions).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 9.
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122

the FDIC in Meyer.
Pollard similarly argues that Malesko supports his cause of action
because Malesko brought suit not only against the private prison
facility where he was held, but also against an employee at the
123
facility. When the suit reached the Court, “the parties, the United
States as amicus curiae, and the Court itself all assumed that a Bivens
124
action against the employee would have been proper.” Despite
denying the plaintiff Bivens relief against the facility, the Court stated
that “remedies available to a privately held federal prisoner for a
‘constitutional deprivation’ ought to mimic the remedies available to
a publicly held federal prisoner for the deprivation—namely, ‘a Bivens
125
claim against the offending individual officer.’” Pollard believes that
this dicta supports his cause of action even though the plaintiff in that
case never pursued a Bivens claim because the statute of limitations
126
expired.
2. The existence of state law remedies does not independently
preclude a Bivens action.
Pollard argues next that Bivens relief is appropriate because
privately held prisoners have no alternative federal remedies and
127
because state remedies are not uniform. The purpose of the Bivens
doctrine is the “deterrence of individual officers who commit
128
unconstitutional acts.”
This deterrence goal is grounded in
separation of powers principles: although the Court can award
damages to the victim of a constitutional violation, only Congress can
create a statutory cause of action or prevent a Bivens remedy

122. Id. at 9–10 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71 (2001)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at 10.
124. Id.; see also Brief of CSC at 13–14, Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (No. 00-860) 2001 WL 535666
(arguing that privately held federal prisoners do not need Bivens remedies against the privately
owned prison management companies because plaintiffs can bring actions against the individual
employees who committed constitutional violations); Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 22, Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (No. 00-860) 2001 WL 558228 (“[I]nmates in
private [federal] institutions already have remedies, remedies that parallel those available to
(and adequate for) their publicly housed counterparts.”).
125. Brief for Respondent, supra note 115, at 12 (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72).
126. Id. at 10; see also Laubach v. Scibana, 301 Fed. Appx. 832, 837 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding
that “Bivens actions follow the same statute of limitations that applies to personal injury suits in
the state where the action accrues”).
127. Brief for Respondent, supra note 115, at 5.
128. Id. at 24 (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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129

altogether.
Pollard cites four Bivens cases to demonstrate that the availability
130
of state law remedies alone does not preclude a Bivens action. First,
in Bivens itself, the plaintiff could have pursued his claim under state
trespass law, but whether he could succeed in tort was unclear even
131
though his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Therefore, the
tort remedy was found ineffective because of its inconsistency with
132
the Fourth Amendment. Pollard believes that state tort law is
ineffective to deter not just Fourth Amendment violations, but also
133
Eighth Amendment violations because of this inconsistency. Second,
Carlson recognized that because liability under the FTCA relies on
tort law of the state where the misconduct occurred, the enforcement
of federal constitutional rights should not be “left to the vagaries of
134
the law of the several States.” Third, Malesko rejected a Bivens
action not because state law remedies were available, but because of
concerns that holding a corporate defendant subject to Bivens liability
135
would undermine the deterrence rationale. The case was dismissed
because a “suit against an individual’s employer was not the kind of
136
deterrence contemplated by Bivens.” Finally, Wilkie was dismissed
because of the availability of multiple non-federal remedies, and not
137
state law remedies alone. Thus, Pollard argues that the existence of a
state tort remedy does not automatically disqualify him from Bivens
138
relief.

129. See id. at 24–25.
130. Id. at 26.
131. See id. (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 392 (1971)). While it was clear that Bivens suffered a Fourth Amendment violation, if
a federal officer could have raised a consent defense to the state trespass suit, Bivens may not
have recovered damages. Id. Thus, an independent cause of action was needed to ensure that
constitutional rights were protected. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. Much of the majority opinion in Bivens explains that state tort law does not protect
the same interests as the Fourth Amendment because many Fourth Amendment violations are
not torts. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392–94. Due to this gap, the creation of an implied remedy was
necessary. Brief for Respondent, supra note 115, at 26. Pollard believes the same gap exists
between Eighth Amendment violations and tort law. Id.
134. Brief for Respondent, supra note 115, at 26–27 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14,
23 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Id. at 27 (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001)).
136. Id. (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70) (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id. at 29–30 (citing Willkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 554 (2007)).
138. Id. at 31.
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VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
Despite his creative arguments, Pollard will face difficulty in
convincing the Supreme Court to affirm the Ninth Circuit. Indeed,
Justice Scalia wrote that “Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which
[the Supreme Court] assumed common-law powers to create causes
139
of action.” The Court likely will agree with the holdings of the
Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and reverse the Ninth Circuit
because it appears that any alternative remedy will suffice to displace
Bivens. To defeat the more likely outcome, Pollard will face the
difficult task of convincing the Court that he seeks a remedy currently
available under Bivens and that he is not arguing for expanding the
doctrine.
A. Pollard must first prove that private prison employees are federal
actors.
First, Pollard must demonstrate that privately contracted prison
officials act under the color of federal law. While the Ninth Circuit
answered this question affirmatively, convincing the Supreme Court is
no easy task. The Court previously stated that “private individuals
operated local jails in the 18th century” and “private contractors were
140
heavily involved in prison management during the 19th century.”
Because of the long history of private jail operation, “correctional
141
functions have never been exclusively public.” Also, privately
employed citizens cannot claim qualified immunity, and without this
defense, labeling them federal actors is unfair. Finally, private citizens
142
have never been held liable under Bivens. Thus, the Court could
reverse because of this factor alone.
Pollard counters these assertions by stating that the use of private
prisons does not prevent private prison guards from engaging in
federal action. Just last year, the Court recognized that when
incarcerated, “[p]risoners are dependent on the State for food,
143
clothing, and necessary medical care.” Moreover, where the function

139. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 405 (1997) (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 404–05.
142. Federal employees are the sole defendants in Bivens actions. See, e.g., Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 (1980) (involving federal prison officials); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228, 230 (1979) (Congressman); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics).
143. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
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of the contractor is identical to the function of a government
144
employee, the state is not relieved of its constitutional duty. If the
state fails in its duty, “the courts have a responsibility to remedy the
resulting Eighth Amendment violation” whether the prison is
145
government-run or privatized. It seems unlikely, but the Court could
agree with this analysis and find that TCI employees perform the
same federal function—incarcerating citizens for federal crimes—as
the BOP employees sued in Carlson. If so, however, Pollard would
then proceed to an analysis under the two-part Wilkie test.
B. The Court should find that Pollard’s alterative remedies are
adequate to displace a Bivens remedy.
Next, Pollard must convince the Court that his alternative
remedies are inadequate. This is difficult because Pollard is
advantaged in a California negligence case. In California, a special
duty exists between jailers and prisoners to protect them from
146
foreseeable harm. Additionally, Pollard’s allegations are actionable
against both medical personnel in a malpractice action and against
non-medical personnel in a negligence action. Pollard could also bring
tort claims against the prison management company under a
147
148
respondeat superior theory of liability not available in Bivens. The
standard of abuse that Pollard would need to demonstrate in order to
succeed under state tort law is much lower than what he would need
149
to prove in an Eighth Amendment Bivens case. Accordingly, existing
state law protects the same interests as the Constitution and, despite
150
Pollard’s argument to the contrary, is sufficient to deny Bivens relief.
Pollard has access to alternative remedies here, and the Court should
find them adequate to address his injuries.

144. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988) (holding that a when a state contracts physicians
for prisoners, the states are not relieved of their constitutional duty to protect prisoners from
Eighth Amendment violations).
145. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1928.
146. Giraldo v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
147. Pollard v. GEO Group, 629 F.3d 843, 871 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom.
Minneci v. Pollard, 131 S. Ct. 2449 (U.S. argued Nov. 1, 2011) (No. 10-1104) (citing Lisa M. v.
Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 360 (Cal. 1995)).
148. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (recognizing that respondeat
superior liability is not available in Bivens because personal involvement is needed for Bivens
liability).
149. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991) (finding that “mere negligence” is
insufficient to satisfy the burden of deliberate indifference).
150. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001).
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Pollard must convince the Court that tort law and constitutional
law do not protect the same interests, such that he needs a Bivens
remedy to protect his Eighth Amendment rights. Pollard reads Bivens
to suggest that state tort remedies are problematic because they
151
under-protect federal rights. Although he believes Bivens supports
him here, he is misguided. The Court in Bivens found that a federal
officer might violate a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights without
152
committing a tort. Thus, an independent remedy was needed to
153
protect the gap between tort and Fourth Amendment law. Bivens is
silent, however, regarding whether a similar gap exists between tort
and Eighth Amendment law. Even Carlson, which authorized Bivens
relief for Eighth Amendment violations, was predicated on the
assumption that the plaintiffs could not recover in tort because of a
154
technicality in state law. Pollard’s allegations, conversely, fit squarely
within California negligence law, allowing him to easily recover in
state court. Thus, because there is no gap between tort law and Eighth
Amendment law here, Pollard does not need a Bivens remedy to
attain proper relief.
Furthermore, the Court is likely to agree with Minneci’s
separation of powers argument—that Congress, not the Court, should
determine whether a Bivens remedy is available. Pollard claims that
the Court has declined Bivens remedies when Congress created an
155
alternative remedial scheme. Thus, the Court should inquire not just
whether alternative remedies are available, but whether the alterative
remedies demonstrate “that Congress expected the Judiciary to stay
156
its Bivens hand.” Here, Pollard asserts that because the briefs and

151. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395 (1971) (holding that “state law may not authorize federal agents to violate the Fourth
Amendment, neither may state law undertake to limit the extent to which federal authority can
be exercised”) (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 394–95.
153. Id. at 395.
154. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (“Indiana law, if applied, would ‘subvert’
‘the policy of allowing complete vindication of constitutional rights.’”) (citations omitted).
155. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 8, Minneci v.
Pollard, No. 10-1104 (U.S. Sep. 19, 2011).
156. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 554 (2007); see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S.
412, 424–25 (1988) (denying a Bivens remedy because Congress established a remedial scheme);
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 377, 388 (1983) (questioning whether an “elaborate remedial system
that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy
considerations, should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy”); Chappell v.
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (“[A] judicial response by way of [a Bivens] remedy would be
plainly inconsistent with Congress’ authority in this field.”).

WEINGARTEN COMMENTARY 1.8.12 V.5 (DO NOT DELETE)

112

1/8/2012 6:46 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 7

the Court’s dicta in Malesko conceded the availability of a Bivens
remedy against privately operated prison employees, the Court
already found that Congress did not intend state remedies to preclude
Bivens here. The Court, however, is not bound by this conclusion and
is likely to consider all of Pollard’s alternative remedies in
determining their adequacy as a substitute for Bivens.
C. Factors counseling hesitation independently warrant the denial of
Bivens here.
Finally, the second prong of the Wilkie test asks if there are
“special factors counseling hesitation” that might cause the Justices to
hesitate in administering the remedy. Here, allowing Pollard to
proceed in Bivens creates two special factors counseling hesitation,
each of which independently warrants the denial of Bivens. First, it
would undermine the Bivens deterrence rationale because private
employees do not have the qualified immunity defense that federal
employees do. Second, granting Bivens liability here imposes
asymmetric liability costs on public and private prison employees.
First, Malesko recognized that “[t]he purpose of Bivens is to deter
individual federal officers from committing constitutional
157
violations.” Granting Pollard a Bivens remedy does not promote this
goal because privately employed prison guards—who are already
liable as individuals in tort and cannot claim qualified immunity—are
deterred from committing constitutional violations without being
liable in Bivens. Additionally, the plaintiff in a tort claim against a
private employee must prove only negligence, as opposed to a
158
heightened constitutional standard such as deliberate indifference.
Thus, because of the prospect of being individually liable in a tort
claim and the substantial overlap between tort law and Eighth
Amendment law, private employees are deterred from committing
constitutional violations without being liable in Bivens. By contrast,
Bivens is necessary for government employees because the FTCA
substitutes the United States as a defendant in tort claims against
159
them. This insulates federal employees from being individually

157. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001).
158. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991) (finding that “mere negligence” is
insufficient to satisfy the burden of deliberate indifference).
159. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A § 1346 (West 2011); see also Westfall Act, § 5,
Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (“Westfall Act”),
Pub. L. No. 100–694, 28 U.S.C.A § 2679(b)(1) (West 2011).
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liable for torts. As such, federal employees are only deterred from
committing constitutional violations through the individual liability
imposed by Bivens. Thus, because private employees are deterred
from committing constitutional violations without the threat of Bivens
liability, allowing Pollard to pursue a Bivens remedy does not promote
the deterrence rationale.
Second, the availability of a qualified immunity defense for
federal government employees would impose asymmetrical liability
costs if Bivens were allowed in this situation. Greater remedies would
be available against private facilities than government-run facilities
because of the qualified immunity defense. Because federal
employees can claim qualified immunity while private employees
cannot, and because qualified immunity “permits courts expeditiously
to weed out suits,” a plaintiff’s chances are greater against private
160
employees than federal employees. If plaintiffs are more likely to
succeed against private employees, then private employees face
greater liability costs then their government counterparts. Malesko
made clear that Congress, not the courts, should determine the
161
resolution of the asymmetry. If the Court believes that Congress
should resolve this asymmetry, Pollard’s chances of success are slim.
VII. CONCLUSION
Pollard faces an uphill battle to be granted Bivens relief. A holding
in Pollard’s favor would expose government contractors to a
substantial increase in liability and would open the door to federal
courts to a broad class of plaintiffs. Such a holding would also
contradict recent cases that denied extensions of Bivens into this area
because of the availability of alternative remedies and other factors
counseling hesitation. Thus, the Court likely will reverse the holding
of the Ninth Circuit and deny Pollard Bivens relief.

160. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 38–39 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232
(1991)).
161. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72 (“Whether it makes sense to impose asymmetrical liability
costs on private prison facilities alone is a question for Congress, not us, to decide.”); see also
Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 562 (“‘Congress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact
of a new species of litigation’ against those who act on the public’s behalf.” (quoting Bush, 462
U.S. at 389)).

